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FIDUCIARY PRINCIPLES AND STATUTORY
FORM IN RELATION TO THE NECESSARY
AND PROPER CLAUSE: POTENTIAL
CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS FOR
CONGRESSIONAL SHORT TITLES

BY
BRIAN CHRISTOPHER JONES*

Abstract
This article explores the principles of fiduciary duty and statutory form
in relation to the "proper" portion of the Necessary and Proper Clause, and
especially in regard to congressional short titles for bills and laws. While
the clause is one of the most influential and controversial constitutional
phrases, its meaning remains shrouded in mystery. At some level amongst
the founders, the Constitution was regarded as a grant of fiduciary duty
from the government to its people; given this, the clause should be read
from such a perspective, and the duties of loyalty and good faith, among
others, come into play when drafting and enacting legislation. Although the
meaning of "proper" has historically been thought of from a propriety
perspective, this article argues that all aspects of bills and laws should be
"proper". This would pose major problems for contemporary legislation,
because many contain tendentious, promotional, and/or misleading short
titles, many of which breach the duties of good faith, loyalty, due care, and
impartiality. By analyzing the historical and contemporary definitions of
"proper" and relying on state constitutions, case law, and legislative
drafting manuals for the latter, this article determines that there is an
abundance of room under the Necessary and Proper Clause to incorporate
proper drafting form, stressing the concepts of accuracy, suitability,
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School of Law, University of Stirling, Scotland (2012); MA: George Mason University (2007);
BA: University of Missouri-Columbia (2003). The author would like to thank Professors Gary
Lawson and Robert G. Natelson for comments on earlier versions of this article.
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impartiality, and exactness. Additionally, in order to quell this irresponsible
feature of legislative drafting, this article proposes a reasonable notice
standard for congressional short titles, a quality which federal law currently
lacks and which many contemporary bills and laws would undoubtedly fail.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Readers of this publication are more than likely aware of the current
state of congressional short bill titles. From the humorous to the farcical,
the practical to the dreamily aspirational, these outlandish policy statements
enshrined into law have only gotten more absurd throughout the Twentyfirst Century. In recent times, Congress has passed some undoubtedly
provocative short titles: the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001,1 the No Child Left

1. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115
Stat. 272.
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Behind Act of 2001,2 the CAN-SPAM Act,3 the SPEECH Act,4 the Credit
CARD Act,' the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act,' and many
more. A glance at these titles may produce an emotional reaction (i.e.
laughter, patriotism, etc.), but to a large extent many congressional short
titles are completely uninformative, unabashedly misleading, and according
to this article, perhaps even unconstitutional.
Before commencing our journey into how the Necessary and Proper
Clause relates to statutory titles, let us first ask a couple of basic questions.
Suppose that Congress enacted laws in Latin or Old English. Would such
laws be constitutionally "proper"? Or, say that instead of starting with
Section 1, a law started with Section 10 and worked its way backwards.
Would such a law be determined "proper"? Why might the response to
these simple questions be "no"?' If laws written in such form could possibly
be not "proper," then this article's main point, that the "proper"aspect of
the Necessary and Proper Clause establishes a minimum standard for
congressional legislative form, should be taken under serious
consideration, especially given the fiduciary principles that legislators are
granted as elected officials.
The Necessary and Proper Clause was written well over two centuries
ago and to date there is still not an authoritative definition of "proper" or a
clear consensus on its constitutional relevancy. In fact many individuals,
from the Founders to contemporary constitutional scholars, question its
inclusion and importance in the Constitution.! To date, the meaning of the
term has largely been limited to a propriety context, determining whether or
not Congress has overstepped its bounds between federal and state law or
deviated from its lawmaking powers as the nation's highest lawmaking

2. No Child Left Behind Act of2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425.
3. Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act of 2003 (CANSPAM Act of 2003), Pub. L. No. 108-187, 117 Stat. 2699.
4. Securing the Protection of Our Enduring and Established Constitutional Heritage Act
(SPEECH Act), Pub. L. No. 111-223, 124 Stat. 2380 (2010).
5. Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009 (Credit CARD Act
of 2009), Pub. L. No. 111-24, 123 Stat. 1734.
6. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).
7. As noted above, I am indebted to Professor Gary Lawson for his critique on an earlier
draft of this essay. In fact, he raised some of these basic, thoughtful questions.
8. See Gary Lawson, Discretion as Delegation: The "Proper" Understandings of the
Nondelegation Doctrine, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 235 (2005) [hereinafter Lawson, Discretion].

Lawson notes that "there was, in fact, a fair number of founding-era figures, including such
luminaries as Patrick Henry, James Monroe, and Daniel Webster, who either argued or assumed
that the word 'proper' added nothing to the Sweeping Clause." Id. at 253. See also Eric A. Posner
& Adrian Vermeule, Interring the Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1721 (2002). In
reference to the Necessary and Proper Clause they note that "[a] more plausible reading because a
less dramatic one, is just that the phrase 'necessary and proper' is an example, among many in the
Constitution, of an internally redundant phrase." Id. at 1728 n.20.
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authority.' In essence, the discussion has centered on the proper
construction and application of how federalism in the U.S. should operate."o
This debate seems appropriate regarding use of the word, but is also a
somewhat narrow interpretation of a word which bears many definitions.
With this article, I hope to shed light on a largely ignored application of the
word, at the heart of which may lie much constitutional significance. It
turns out that "proper" has possessed a remarkably similar definition from
the time when the Constitution was written until present day. As will be
seen below, the term embodies fiduciary principles (i.e. reasonableness,
impartiality, good faith, and due care), yet also incorporates drafting
principles, including: accuracy, suitability, and exactness. These principles
will be further elaborated on as this paper unfolds.
If the only inferences that can be made of the word "proper" in Article I
are in regard to the separation of powers between Congress and individual
states, then its inclusion seems altogether superfluous. The Constitution
certainly elaborates on these powers at length in Articles I and IV." Of late
there has been a renewed interest by the Supreme Court in the Necessary
and Proper Clause, most of which has complemented the propriety view.12
Yet, could it be that the founders included the phrase for reasons other than
separation of powers issues, which they had already enumerated?" It seems
9. This has been noted in Supreme Court cases, such as: Printz v. United States, 521 U.S.
898, 923 (1997); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 732 (1999); Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 34
(2005); Jinks v. Richland Cty, S.C., 538 U.S. 456, 462 (2003); in law review articles, such as:
Gary Lawson & Patricia B. Granger, The 'Proper' Scope of Federal Power: A Jurisdictional
Interpretationof the Sweeping Clause, 43 DUKE L.J. 267 (1993) [hereinafter Lawson & Granger,
Scope]; Randy E. Barnett, The OriginalMeaning of the Necessary and Proper Clause, 6 U. PA. J.

CONST. L. 183 (2003) [hereinafter Barnett, Original Meaning]; Randy E. Barnett, The Proper
Scope of the Police Power, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 429 (2004) [hereinafter Barnett, Police
Power]; or J. Randy Beck, The New Jurisprudenceof the Necessary and Proper Clause, 2002 U.

ILL. L. REV. 581 (2002) [hereinafter Beck, New Jurisprudence];and even in founding documents,
such as: THE FEDERALIST No. 33 (Alexander Hamilton). Hamilton states that "The propriety of a
law, in a constitutional light, must always be determined by the nature of the powers upon which it
is founded." Id.
10. Beck, New Jurisprudence,supra note 9, at 637 n.368: "Other scholars have drawn upon
Lawson and Granger's analysis, relying on the term 'proper' as a source of federalism or
separation of powers restraints." He also notes that "the stronger evidence points toward treatment
of the propriety limitation as an internal restraint, intended to ensure a 'proper' fit between a
measure adopted by Congress and the constitutional end the measure purports to pursue. The
propriety of a law does not depend on whether it interferes with unenumerated rights of states,
individuals or other federal actors, but rather on whether Congress has selected a proper means in
light of the nature of the constitutional power invoked." Id. at 641 (emphasis in original). See also
Stephen Gardbaum, Rethinking Constitutional Federalism, 74 TEX. L. REV. 795 (1996) and
Michael Stokes Paulsen, Abrogating Stare Decisis by Statute: May Congress Remove the
PrecedentialEffect of Roe and Casey?, 109 YALE L.J. 1535 (2000).
11. U.S. Const. art. I & art. IV.
12. Printz, 521 U.S. at 923; Alden, 527 U.S. at 732; Jinks, 538 U.S. at 462; Gonzales, 545

U.S. at 34; Nat. Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2592 (2012).
13.

Indeed, other scholars have challenged this propriety view as well. Beck notes that
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logical that they would have desired all aspects of laws to be proper
(including both substance and form), and not merely proper in regard to
separation of powers issues. If they simply wished for them to be
appropriate in a proprietary sense, this could have been easily stated
without ambiguity.
Incorporating an analysis of the "proper" portion of the clause, this
article establishes that many congressional short titles breach duties of
fiduciary responsibility and thus cross the line of what should be deemed
"proper" in regard to legislative statutory form. In doing so, it first
investigates whether or not the Constitution and bills/acts of Congress can
be viewed from a fiduciary standpoint. Next, it seeks to provide a more
comprehensive meaning to the term "proper," investigating both the
historical and contemporary meaning of the word, and employing devices
ranging from dictionaries to state legislative drafting manuals. Analyzing
the intersection between fiduciary principles and proper statutory form, it
then explores some of the major fiduciary principles in regard to how
tendentious and misleading short titles on bills and laws breach these
fiduciary principles. Finally, the article proposes that the titles of laws
should properly fit their subject matter and thus provide reasonable notice
to both lawmakers and the general public about the laws being proposed
and those which have already been enacted.

II. DISCLAIMER
The Constitution does not specifically mention a detailed form of
congressional bills or construction of bill titles. Unlike some state
constitutions, this was never introduced in Article I. When Congress began
making law, most bills went by their long titles (i.e. "An Act to. . ."). Over
the years, there have been few formal rules or regulations providing for how
legislative short titles should be drafted. 14 For all intents and purposes, the

"[h]istorical analysis and a close reading of McCulloch suggest that one should view the propriety
requirement as regulating the fit between congressional means and constitutional ends, rather than
as a textual hook for principles of federalism, separation of powers, or individual liberty." Beck,
New Jurisprudence,supra note 9, at 627.

14. There are no mentions of short titles in the House Rules, which can be found online
through the Government Printing Office, available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/HMANI 12/pdf/HMAN-l 12-houserules.pdf (last visited Sept. 13, 2013). Additionally, there are only very
short mentions of short bill titles in official drafting documents proffered by the U.S. House
Drafting Manual, available at http://www.house.gov/legcoun/pdf/draftstyle.pdf (last visited Sept.
13, 2013). The Senate does not offer a publicly available drafting manual on any of their websites.
However, I did find a Senate drafting manual from 1997 publicly available on Prof. William
website,
available
at
Yale
Law
School
Eskridge
Jr.'s
http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/Faculty/SenateOfficeoftheLegislativeCounselLegislativ
eDraftingManual(1997).pdf (last visited Sept. 13, 2013). The contents in relation to short titles are
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lack of short title acknowledgment in the Constitution would make it very
difficult to challenge the constitutionality of a short title. However, Article
I, Section 8, Clause 18 of the U.S. Constitution proclaims that Congress
shall have power "[T]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and
proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other
Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States,
or in any Department or Officer thereof."'" Given the title the "Sweeping
Clause" 6 by some, this phrase has both enamored and perplexed
commentators ever since the document was ratified.
Similar to the reactions of many founding members, the contemporary
meaning of the Necessary and Proper Clause produces heated debate
concerning whether it expands or limits Congressional power, as it has
become a lightning rod for advocates of both big and small government,
depending on the interpretation one advocates." Indeed, the clause has
become so noticeable in recent years that Cambridge University Press
recently published a book devoted to the origins of the terse yet powerful
phrase, and this text is heavily cited throughout this article." However, I
wish to separate myself from the expansion/restriction arguments at the
outset. Although I touch on both positions in this article in relation to the
history and development of the clause, I am more concerned with whether

very similar to those of the House manual available above.
15. U.S. Const. art. 1,§ 8, cl. 18 (emphasis added).
16.

Lawson, Discretion,supra note 8, at 237.

17. A significant portion of debate concerns whether or not the clause is a restricting
adjectival modifier or a ratchet to enhance congressional power. Many contemporary scholars
have deemed the clause a limitation on congressional power. Lawson and Seidman call the phrase
an "explicit textual limitation on congressional powers." Gary Lawson & Guy 1. Seidman,
Necessity, Propriety, and Reasonableness, taken from LAWSON ET AL., ORIGINS, infra note 18, at

134. They also note that it is a "sensible, and even obvious place for such a constraint." Id. at 135.
In earlier works, Lawson unabashedly calls it "most obviously. . .not a self-contained grant of
power." Lawson & Granger, Scope, supra note 9, at 274. Engdahl considers the clause an
"intrinsic restraint on federal lawmaking power," and states that "as applied to Congress's own
powers, however, the Clause is not a ratchet; instead, it compounds the discretion given to
Congress by the other grants of legislative power." David E. Engdahl, The Necessary and Proper
Clause As an Intrinsic Restrainton FederalLawmaking Power, 22 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 107
(1998). This may be a plausible interpretation, at least according to the way that the phrase is not
worded; Miller notes that the clause does not say "as to it shall seem necessary and proper;" or

which "it shall judge necessary and proper;" or even which "it may deem necessary and proper."
Geoffrey P. Miller, The Corporate Law Background of the Necessary and Proper Clause, taken
from LAWSON ET AL., ORIGINS, infra note 18, at 158-159 [hereinafter, Miller, Corporate Law].

Therefore if the drafters wished to express the sentiment that Congress can capriciously determine
what laws are necessary and proper, then they could have done so very easily. All of the above
alternative phrases were common in corporate charters around the same time the Constitution was

written, and it is quite significant that none of the phrases Miller suggests were used in the actual
clause.
18. GARY LAWSON, GEOFFREY P. MILLER, ROBERT G. NATELSON & GUY I. SEIDMAN, THE
ORIGINS OF THE NECESSARY AND PROPER CLAUSE (2010) [hereafter LAWSON, ET AL., ORIGINS].
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or not the clause, and specifically the word "proper," can be analyzed and
interpreted in terms of a "proper" form of laws. For in this one word it may
be that the drafters of the Constitution have set a standard by which the
laws of the United States should be upheld.
It should also be acknowledged that this is not another "single subject"
rule article that critiques or advocates the implementation or reform of
state-level single-subject provisions for bills and laws.19 To propose a single
subject amendment in a legislative body such as the U.S. Congress seems
like an extremely challenging and ambitious recommendation, especially
given the Senate's non-germane amendment allowances.20 That being said,
this article does focus on accuracy and proper drafting form, so the two
ideas are inextricably related, at least to some extent. Additionally, this
article employs state constitutions, case law, and state legislative drafting
manuals in order to ascertain a contemporary meaning of "proper;" thus,
state-level influence is not completely abandoned in this analysis, but
embraced as a possible source which could aid federal legislative

practices. 2 1

III. THE CONSTITUTION AND CONGRESSIONAL
BILLS/ACTS FROM A FIDUCIARY PERSPECTIVE
Some commentators believe that the Constitution supplied the
government and its agents with certain fiduciary duties and thus should be
read from a fiduciary perspective. Throughout the past decade, Robert
Natelson has been instrumental in expounding this view, most recently in
the book The Origins of the Necessary and Proper Clause mentioned

19. See generally Brannon P. Denning & Brooks R. Smith, The Truth-in-Legislation
Amendment: An Idea Whose Time Has Come, 78 TENN. L. REV. 831 (2010); Robert D. Cooter &
Michael D. Gilbert, A Theory of Direct Democracy and the Single Subject Rule, 110 COLUM. L.
REv. 687 (2010); Michael D. Gilbert, Single Subject Rules and the Legislative Process, 67 U.
PIrr. L. REV. 803, 806-07 (2006); Martha J. Dragich, State Constitutional Restrictions on
Legislative Procedure: Rethinking the Analysis of Original Purpose, Single Subject, and Clear
Title Challenges, 38 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 103 (2001).
20. MARTIN B. GOLD, SENATE PROCEDURE AND PRACTICE 106-110 (2d. ed. 2008).
21. Additionally, there is some question as to whether the Necessary and Proper Clause
would come into play under certain situations. Many believe the clause is a recital of Congress'
incidental powers. If this is the case, the clause, and therefore the word "proper", may only be a
requirement for laws under the incidental powers doctrine and not all laws. Thus if Congress
passes a safety standards law for ships, that is part of its core Commerce Clause authority, and the
Necessary and Proper Clause may not factor into such a law, thus potentially excluding the
applications laid out in this article. I thank Professor Natelson for raising this point and providing
such an example. However, while an interesting and practical point, this is another debate for
another time, and its significance will not be further analyzed or answered in this paper.
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above,22 but on many other occasions as well.23 Natelson asserts that the
"general welfare" provision "was one of a number of provisions inserted to
impose fiduciary-style rules on the new federal government," and noted that
governmental conduct should "mimic that of the private-law fiduciary."24 In
essence, he states that the government "had a fiduciary obligation to
manage properly what had been entrusted to it." 25 He further notes that
essayists,26 politicians,27 and lawyers28 all "routinely reaffirmed that public
officials were merely the trustees, agents, guardians, or servants of the
people."29 Natelson provides evidence that founders such as James
Madison, Alexander Hamilton, Pierce Butler, Nathaniel Gorham,
Gouverneur Morris, Edbridge Gerry, Luther Martin, Rufus King, and John
Dickinson all viewed the operations of government from a fiduciary
perspective.30 He provides further evidence that many founders spoke of
government officials as servants, agents, guardians, or trustees of the
general public. 3 1 Although Natelson's motives of asserting such fiduciary
obligations are different from the aim of this article, it appears he has
established, to a significant degree, that inherent in the Constitution was an
implied fiduciary obligation that the government and its officials had to the
people. Thus, not only can the Constitution be read from a fiduciary
perspective, but also the inherent duties of elected officials should be
viewed from this perspective. If this is the case, the main output provided

22. See LAWSON, ET AL., ORIGINS, supra note 18, at ch. 4-5.
23. See Robert G. Natelson, The Agency Law Origins of the Necessary and Proper Clause,
55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 243 (2004) [hereinafter Natelson, Agency Law Origins]; Robert G.
Natelson, The Constitution and the Public Trust, 52 BUFF. L. REv. 1077 (2004) [hereinafter
Natelson, Public Trust]; Robert G. Natelson, The General Welfare Clause and the Public Trust:
An Essay in Original Understanding, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 1 (2003) [hereafter Natelson, General
Welfare]; Robert G. Natelson, The Founders' Hermeneutic: The Real Original Understandingof
Original Intent, 68 OHIo ST. L.J. 1239 (2007) [hereafter Natelson, Founders]; Robert G. Natelson,
Judicial Review ofSpecial Interest Spending: The General Welfare Clause and the FiduciaryLaw
of the Founders, 11 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 239 (2007) [hereinafter Natelson, JudicialReview].
24. Natelson, JudicialReview, supra note 23, at 244-245.
25. Id., at 244 n.22 (citing JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT § 136,
at 190).
26. Id., at 244 n.23 (citing WILLIAM PETYT, JUS PARLIAMENTARIUM: OR, THE ANCIENT
POWER, JURISDICTION, RIGHTS, LIBERTIES, AND PRIVILEGES, OF THE MOST HIGH COURT OR
PARLIAMENT (1741)).
27. Id., at 244 n.24 (citing Natelson, Public Trust; also citing Edmund Burke, Thoughts on
the Cause of the Present Discontents (1770), reprinted in 1 SELECT WORKS OF EDMUND BURKE
at 118 (1999) (E.J. Payne, ed., 1874)).
28. Id., at 244 n.25 (citing Natelson, Public Trust; also citing JAMES OTIS, THE RIGHT OF
THE BRITISH COLONIES ASSERTED AND PROVED at 98 (2d ed. 1766)).
29. Id., at 244 n.26.
30. Natelson, Public Trust, supra note 23, at 1083.
31. Id., at 1084. The founders he mentions are: Madison, Dickinson, John Jay, Tench Coxe,
George Washington, and James Kent.
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by legislators-bills, and ultimately laws-can be viewed in the same
manner and should apply to such principles.
From founders to modem theorists, others have explicitly mentioned
this fiduciary obligation as well. James Madison noted this in Federalist No.
46, stating: "The federal and state governments are in fact but different
agents and trustees of the people."3 2 More recently, Hannah Pitkin stated
that "the representative's duty, his role as a representative, is generally not
to get reelected, but to do what is best for those he represents,"" and she
argued that political representation is "a fiduciary relationship, involving
trust and obligation on both sides."3 4 Additionally, Evan Criddle has argued
that "[a]ll agents and instrumentalities of the state are . . . subject to

fiduciary duties in discharging their responsibilities,"" and Lawson and
Seidman note that what has historically been called "reasonableness" in the
constitutional context is essentially a "principle of fiduciary public agency"
doctrine, the latter being a more accurate description of such powers.
Congress' primary function is to produce law; and, most frequently,
public law. Therefore, congressional bills and laws initiated by lawmakers
would thus have to incorporate and abide by these fiduciary principles in
order to maintain legitimacy.

IV. DETERMINING

THE MEANING OF "PROPER"

A. HISTORICAL MEANING
The addition of the Necessary and Proper Clause into the Constitution
is shrouded in mystery. It has been said that the clause was not "the subject
of any debate from its initial proposal to the Convention's final adoption of
the Constitution."" Added by the Committee of Detail, the clause
inconspicuously made its way into the final version of the Constitution.
Once enshrined into law, the clause did receive a good amount of attention
from federalists and opponents regarding whether or not it expanded or
limited congressional power, but the conversations provided scant evidence

32.
33.

THE FEDERALIST NO. 46 (James Madison).
HANNA FENICHEL PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 164 (1967).

34. Id., at 128.
35. Evan J. Criddle, FiduciaryAdministration: Rethinking PopularRepresentationin Agency
Rulemaking, 88 TEX. L. REV. 441, 473 (2010).
36. LAWSON ET AL., ORIGINS, supra note 18, at 122. They also note that this could be called
the "principle of public faithfulness" or the "principle of official responsibility." For a further take
on the fiduciary duties of politicians, see also Theodore Rave, Politiciansas Fiduciaries, 126(3)
HARV. L. REv. 671 (2013).
37. Randy Barnett, The Choice Between Madison and FDR, 31 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y

1007 (2008).
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of the clause's significance." This has led scholars to acknowledge that "it
is often hard to figure out its meaning,"3 ' and that they "can do no more
than deduce [it]."" Analysis of state ratification debates have also proved
unfruitful, leaving one commentator to suggest that, "[i]f there are nuggets
to be mined in the standard sources of constitutional history, they seem thus
far to have escaped notice."41 Yet this bleak assessment has not stopped
authors from exploring the word's historical meaning.
Discussion around the phrase has at times concerned whether or not a
statute can be necessary without being proper. Some believe that "proper" is
merely a synonym for "necessary"4 2 and that the phrase is a constitutional
redundancy.4 3 The most authoritative response as to the phrase's
constitutional significance derives from the 1819 Supreme Court decision
of McCulloch v. Maryland." In fact, throughout McCulloch "proper" is

routinely overlooked,45 which may add credence to this argument. Yet if the
word is redundant, then its inclusion is superfluous, and many authors
disagree with the notion that "proper" carries no constitutional meaning.
Natelson states that "the manner in which the delegates employed the word
'proper' strongly suggested that federal laws, even if 'necessary', would not
be 'proper' under certain conditions."4 6 Barnett notes: "an otherwise
necessary law can still be improper if it employs improper means."" Also,
both adjectival components of the Necessary and Proper Clause were added
at different points." Therefore, they likely had separate and distinct
meanings. Lawson considers this conclusion unquestionably definitive,
38.

Id., at 1008-1009.

39.

Barnett, OriginalMeaning, supra note 9, at 216.

40. LAWSON ET AL., ORIGINS, supra note 18, at 78.
41. Id., at 3.
42. Id., at 89. In fact, this was the opposing view of the attorney in McCulloch, Daniel
Webster, who lost the case.
43. Posner & Vermeule, supranote 8.
44. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
45. Beck notes that "Chief Justice Marshall did not explicitly define the term 'proper' in
McCulloch. Though he indicated that 'necessary' and 'proper' create distinct requirements, he
nowhere explained the latter restriction. . . one may look to McCulloch for the meaning of the
term 'necessary', but must look elsewhere for the meaning of 'proper'." Beck, New Jurisprudence
at 644. However, in McCulloch Marshall does say: "The propriety of this remark would seem to
be generally acknowledged by the universal acquiescence in the construction which has been
uniformly put on the 3rd section of the 4th article of the Constitution. The power to 'make all
needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the United
States' is not more comprehensive than the power 'to make all laws which shall be necessary and
proper for carrying into execution' the powers of the Government. Yet all admit the
constitutionality of a Territorial Government, which is a corporate body." McCulloch, 17 U.S. at
422.
46. LAWSON ET AL., ORIGINS, supra note 18, at 93. Natelson states that they would not be
proper if they violated Congress's fiduciary responsibilities.
47. Barnett, Original Meaning, at 220 (emphasis in original).
48.

Natelson, Framing and Adoption, at 89.
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remarking: "[a]t least one thing is very clear: the words would have meant
something;"4 9 and he further states that assigning meaning to "proper" in
this day and age is not only "downright banal,"o5 but "blandly
conventional." 5 '
Since the Necessary and Proper Clause received little debate during its
constitutional implementation, those wishing to attribute meaning to it must
find alternative ways of doing so. The most recent text devoted to the clause
by Lawson, et al., attempts to shed some light on the clause's origins. 52 In
doing this, they analyze a variety of sources that could potentially aid in
understanding the clause, such as: 18th Century statute drafting in England
and America; agency law and the role of fiduciaries; examination of state
constitutions and other state statutes; and administrative law and corporate
charters. 53 Their endeavor is interesting and illuminating in many respects,
as the authors lend substantial significance to the clause and examine it
accordingly.
One article in the text examines state constitutions around the time the
Constitution was drafted. Lawson and Seidman note that on several
occasions "the word 'proper' is used to mean something quite strict, such as
'distinctively fitted to or suited for'," and at times these referred to: "proper
forms of government;" "'proper laws' for creating districts and counties;"
and "proper form for submission to the people for initiatives."54 Others have
gone back to dictionaries published around the time the clause was written.
Samuel Johnson's Dictionary of 1786 had two overlapping entries that were
adaptable for the legal context: one of which was "'suitable"' and another
stating "'exact; accurate; just'."1' The former would seem to fall under both
the proprietary and drafting perspective of proper, while the latter fittingly
corresponds with only the drafting perspective.5 6

49.

Lawson, Discretion, at 241.

50. Id., at 254. Lawson says the following: "the simple view that the words 'necessary' and
'proper' have distinct meanings, and that the word 'proper' incorporates some set of structural
principles into the Sweeping Clause, is downright banal. That view has been specifically endorsed
by a large assortment of scholars, including (and these are just the major scholars who I personally
know will not be offended by being named) Randy Barnett, Steve Calabresi, Stephen Gardbaum,
Richard Garnett, Mike Paulsen, and Sai Prakash. Less to the point for me, though perhaps more to
the point for others, the position has been specifically endorsed by the Supreme Court on at least
three occasions in recent years." The Supreme Court cases he mentions were: Jinks v. Richland
County, 538 U.S. 456, 462-465 (2003); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 732-733 (1999); Printz v.
UnitedStates, 521 U.S. 898, 923-924 (1997).
51. LAWSON, Discretion,Id., at 255.
52. LAWSON, ET AL., ORIGINS, supra note 18.
53. Id.
54. LAWSON, ET. AL., ORIGINS, supra note 18, at 47. State examples in this case are taken
from the Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and Massachusetts Constitutions.
55. Natelson, Legal Origins, at 79.

56.

Although, a "suitable" short title could easily follow from this meaning as well.
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Sources outside the political realm have also been examined. From his
analysis of corporate charters around the U.S. constitutional drafting period,
Miller notes: "terms such as 'necessary' and 'proper' were not defined in
colonial or early federal charters," and although they were used, "there is
also plenty of variation."" Yet in concluding his analysis regarding
corporate charters Miller notes that "proper" could:
convey the idea that in carrying out a given authority, the
company or its managers should design the actions taken so
as to consider the effect on stakeholders in the firm. As
applied to the Constitution's Necessary and Proper Clause,
the message could be that laws must not only serve the
general interests of the country as a whole, but must also
take into account the individual interests of particular
citizens. Thus even if a law qualifies as 'necessary', it
could still be outside congressional authority if, without
adequate justification, it discriminates or disproportionately
affects the interests of individual citizens vis-A-vis others."
Thus, it appears that many scholars emphasize the "proper" portion of the
clause to have real, significant meaning. And though these arguments
seemed to align more with legislative substance rather than its form or
drafting qualities, the latter corresponds well with the early definitions of
the word put forward in both political and non-political contexts. However,
as noted above, attributing a definition to "proper" from a historical context
in light of the Necessary and Proper Clause is exceedingly difficult, mainly
because of the dearth of source material as to why the term was added to the
Constitution. Therefore, an exploration into contemporary materials is in
order.
B. CONTEMPORARY MEANING
Since the historical attempt to unearth the definition of proper has
proven varied and undeveloped, this article now looks to more modern
instruments to help guide its meaning. In fact, Miller states that "the
meaning of the Necessary and Proper Clause today is not necessarily
governed by inferences about original understanding."59 The simple fact
that the precise constitutional meaning of "proper" has escaped definition
for over two hundred years lends credence to Miller's statement. To aid in

57. Miller, Corporate Law, at 145.
58. Id., at 174.
59.

Id.
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providing a contemporary definition of the word, the discussion which
follows employs state constitutions, case law, drafting manuals, and legal
and non-legal dictionaries.
Many state constitutions use the word in relation to laws or bill titles,
and these are helpful when attempting to decipher a contemporary meaning
for "proper."60 It should be noted, however, that many of these references
are in relation to one-subject clauses for bills, a rule that Congress does not
have in relation to legislation. Nonetheless, analyzing the use of proper in
this context aids our endeavor; unlike federal short titles, state laws have
been challenged in courts to determine their constitutionality. 6 Resultantly,
certain jurisdictions have established definitions and criteria for the phrase
"properly connected," which is commonly used in many state constitutions.
These will be explored more below.
Examples of "proper" used throughout state constitutions are many:
Florida's constitution states that "[e]very law shall embrace but one subject
and matter properly connected therewith, and the subject shall be briefly
expressed in the title;"62 Idaho's constitution says "[e]very act shall embrace
but one subject and matters properly connected therewith, which subject
shall be expressed in the title;" 63 Indiana's constitution declares "[a]n
act.. .shall be confined to one subject and matters properly connected
therewith;"64 Nevada's constitution reads "[e]ach law enacted by the
Legislature shall embrace but one subject, and matter, properly connected
therewith, which subject shall be briefly expressed in the title;" New
Jersey's constitution asserts that "[t]o avoid improper influences which may
result from intermixing in one and the same act such things as have no
proper relation to each other, every law shall embrace but one object, and
that shall be expressed in the title;"66 Oregon's constitution declares
"[e]very Act shall embrace but one subject, and matters properly connected
therewith, which subject shall be expressed in the title;" 67 and Arizona's
60. Although it is acknowledged that some of these provisions were implemented in the 19th
and 2 0th centuries (See Dragich,supra note 19), yet they are still in use today, and as will be seen

below, are still adjudicated in state courts.
61. My previous piece on drafting short titles (Brian Christopher Jones, Drafting Proper
Short Bill Titles: Do States Have the Answer?, 23(2) STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 455 (2012)

[hereinafter Jones, Short Titles]) touches on these, but its focus is altogether quite different. That
piece explores the differing policies and procedures that states have in regard to drafting short
titles. This piece focuses on determining the meaning of "proper" in relation to the Necessary and
Proper Clause, and is only using state constitutions or drafting manuals as devices to enable
exploration of the meaning behind this particular word.
62. FLA. CONST. art. Ill, § 6 (emphasis added).
63. IDAHO CONST. art. Ill, § 16 (emphasis added).
64. IND. CONST. art. IV, § 19 (emphasis added).
65. NEV. CONST. art. IV, § 17 (emphasis added).
66. N.J. CONST. art. IV, § 7, cl. 4 (emphasis added).
67. OR. CONST. art. IV, § 20 (emphasis added).
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constitution acknowledges "[e]very act shall embrace but one subject and
matters properly connected therewith, which subject shall be expressed in
the title."68
State courts have dealt with challenges to their single-subject provisions
and some have set standards to remedy these situations in the future,
especially in terms of the "properly connected" phrase. According to
Florida courts, "[t]here is a proper connection between a provision and the
subject '(1) if the connection is natural or logical, or (2) if there is a
reasonable explanation for how the provision is (a) necessary to the subject
or (b) tends to make effective or promote the objects and purposes of
legislation included in the subject."' 6 The courts also note that "[i]n
determining whether a reasonable explanation exists for the connection
between a specific provision and the single subject, the court may consider
the citation name, the full title, the preamble, and the provisions in the body
of the act."o Thus, "natural" and "logical" are the first aspects Florida
courts establish in terms of titles. The second aspect is a bit more difficult to
determine, but still calls for reasonableness.
The Indiana Supreme Court believes in a liberal interpretation of the
"properly connected" phrase in its constitution, and has held the following:
"if there is any reasonable basis for grouping together in one act various
matters of the same nature, and the public cannot be deceived reasonably
thereby, the act is valid."" Minnesota courts also believe that Minnesota's
constitution's single-subject clause should be liberally construed, and notes
in relation to its "properly connected" phrase, that the "term 'subject', as
used in the constitution, is to be given a broad and extended meaning. All
that is necessary is that the act should embrace some one [sic] general
subject; and by this is meant, merely, that all matters treated of should fall
under some one [sic] general idea, be so connected with or related to each
other, either logically or in popular understanding, as to be parts of, or
germane to, one general subject."72

68. ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, § 13 (emphasis added).
69. Ellis v. Hunter, So. 3d 373; 2009 Fla. App. LEXIS 1974 (citing Franklin v. State, 887 So.
2d 1063, 1072 (Fla. 2004)).
70. Id.
71. Loparex, LLC. v. MPI Release Technologies, LLC., 964 N.E.2d 806, 813 (Ind. 2012)
(citing Stith Petroleum Co. v. Dep't of Audit & Control, 5 N.E.2d 517, 521 (Ind. 1937)).
72. Associated Builders and Contractors v. Ventura, 610 N.W.2d 293, 299-300 (Minn. 2000)
(citing Johnson v. Harrison, 50 N.W.2d 923, 924 (Minn. 1891)). It further notes that "[a]s to the
title provision, we explained that the clause is intended to prevent fraud or surprise upon the
legislature and the public by prohibiting the inclusion of 'provisions in a bill whose title gives no
intimation of the nature of the proposed legislation', but we accord it the same liberal construction
as the single subject provision" (citing State ex rel. Olsen v. Board of Control of State Inst., 88
N.W. 533, 536 (Minn. 1902)).
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The selected examples above find common ground in that they stress
certain factors: "properly connected" includes being "reasonable" and
"logical." These attributes correspond with fiduciary principles and proper
drafting form. To a certain extent, they also take into consideration those
interacting with legislation that are not legislative insiders writing or voting
on legislation: Indiana mentions the "public" and Minnesota mentions a
"popular understanding." This language is not accidental. Many of the
constitutional and case law uses of "proper" also compare well with Samuel
Johnson's Dictionary of 1786, as both his entries of the word apply to the
examples above. 73 His first entry, "suitable," ensures that the title of a law is
suitable for the legislation in question. This seems to be a more general type
of interpretation, and could be applied in a proprietary sense. Yet the second
portion, "exact; accurate; just" also characterizes the above examples, as
they ensure that the title is an accurate description or indication of the
proposed law. Johnson's entries correspond with the other devices
examined below as well, such as drafting manuals and dictionaries.
In order to complement state constitutional and case law use of
"proper," state legislative drafting manuals were examined to ascertain if
they use the word in relation to bills and/or bill titles. Since these manuals
aid in crafting law, their use of the word should provide some guidance for
this article's endeavor. Indeed, many of these legislative drafting
instruments do use the word frequently: Alaska's manual consistently
mentions "proper form" and "proper technique;"74 Colorado's manual
states that "[tjhe drafter's function is to devise appropriate statutory
language in proper form to carry out the sponsor's objectives;"7 Hawaii's
manual speaks of a "properappreciation of the legislative intent;" 76 Maine's
manual states that "[e]ach legislative instrument must have a proper
authority for introduction;"n Maryland's manual notes that "[i]f a bill's
subject matter is broader than its title, the bill is unconstitutional because
the requirement of proper notice to legislators and citizens is not
fulfilled;"7 Montana's manual speaks of the "properform and arrangement

73. Natelson, Legal Origins, supra note 18, at 79.
74. ALASKA LEGIS. AFFAIRS AGENCY, MANUAL OF LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING, at 19, 37, 38,
41, 50, 59, etc. (2007), available at http://w3.legis.state.ak.us/docs/pdf/DraftingManual2007.pdf
(last visited Sept. 13, 2013) (emphasis added).
75. CoLo OFFICE OF LEGIS. LEGAL SERVS., COLO. LEGIS. DRAFTING MANUAL, §II on
Preliminary Drafting Considerations, at 1-4 (2012) (emphasis added).
76. KEN TAKAYAMA, LEGIS. DRAFTING BUREAU, HAW. LEGIS. DRAFTING MANUAL, at 6
(9th ed. 2007), available at http://www.state.hi.us/Irb/rpts96/dftman.pdf (last visited Sept. 13,
2013) (emphasis added).
77. LEGIS. COUNSEL, ME. LEGIS. DRAFTING MANUAL, at 2 (2009), available at
http://www.maine.gov/legis/ros/manual/Draftman2009.pdf (last visited Sept. 13, 2013) (emphasis
added).
78. DEP'T OF LEGIS. SERVS., LEGIS. DRAFTING MANUAL, at 29-30 (2010), available at
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of a bill;"79 New Mexico's guide declares that "[s]ince a properly prepared
title is essential to the constitutionality of any bill that becomes law, the title
should be carefully reviewed to determine that it covers everything in the
bill;"s0 when providing a checklist for legislative drafters, North Dakota's
manual asks, "[d]oes the bill or resolution have a proper title?""1 and South
Dakota's manual acknowledges that "[a] properly prepared bill consists of a
title, an enacting clause, and a body of provisions. The correct form of the
title and the enacting clause is specified in the Constitution and further
defined by statute and custom." 82
State drafting manuals repeatedly use the term "proper," and many of
them are in reference to "proper" form and technique; some mentions are
even specifically in regard to bill titles. The elements of propriety are
apparent in some usages, such as in Maine's and Hawaii's drafting
manuals.83 However, that such official drafting devices mix both propriety
and accuracy is of significance. Accuracy, it seems, has an inherently robust
connection to the propriety aspects of the word "proper."
More contemporary instruments can also be consulted in regard to the
definition of "proper," because these could provide a more complete picture
of the term's use and significance in modem times. The Oxford English
Dictionarysupplies three main definitions of the word "proper," which are:
(1) truly what something is said or regarded to be; genuine; (2) of the
required or correct type or form; suitable or appropriate; (3) belonging or
relating exclusively or distinctively to; particular to.84 Merriam-Webster
provides nine definitions of the word, four of which would help with the
current legal analysis: (1) belonging to one; own; (2) strictly limited to a
specified thing, place, or idea; (3) strictly accurate: correct; and (4) marked
by suitability, rightness, or appropriateness: fit."

http://dls.state.md.us/data/legandana/legandana..bildra/legandana
anual201 1.pdf (last visited Sept. 13, 2013) (emphasis added).
79.

bildra bildraman/BillDraftingM

MONT. LEGIS. SERVS. DIV., BILL DRAFTING MANUAL, at 45 (2010), available at

http://leg.mt.gov/content/Publications/2010-bill-drafting-manual.pdf (last visited Sept. 13, 2013)
(emphasis added).
80.

N.M. LEGIS. COUNSEL SERV., NEW MEXICO LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING MANUAL, at 21

(2008) availableat http://www.nmlegis.gov/lcs/lcsdocs/draftman.pdf (last visited Sept. 13, 2013).
81.

LEGIS. COUNSEL, N.D. LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING MANUAL,

at 2 (2013), available at

http://www.legis.nd.gov/files/general/2013draftingmanual.pdf?20130912231414 (last visited Sept.
13, 2013) (emphasis added).
at
available
7,
at
MANUAL,
DRAFTING
82. S.D.
http://legis.state.sd.us/general/DraftingManual.pdf (last visited Sept. 13, 2013) (emphasis added).
83.

ME. LEGIS. DRAFTING MANUAL, supra note 77; HAW. LEGIS. DRAFTING MANUAL,

supra note 76.
84. OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, available at www.oxforddictionaries.com (last visited
Sept. 13, 2013).
85.

MERRIAM-WEBSTER

ONLINE

DICTIONARY,

webster.com/dictionary/proper (last visited Sept. 13, 2013).

available

at

http://www.merriam-
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Modem editions of Black's Law Dictionary do not actually define the
word "proper."" However, an older version of Black's defines the word as:
"That which is fit, suitable, appropriate, adapted, correct. Reasonably
sufficient. Peculiar; naturally or essentially belonging to a person or thing;
not common; appropriate; one's own."" The first line of this definition
appears to be the most appropriate for legislation in the necessary and
proper context. "Fit," "suitable," "appropriate," and "correct" all correspond
with the "proprietary" and the drafting model of interpretation, and it is not
unreasonable to say that short titles for bills and laws should "fit" the
requisite text of a piece of legislation, or that they should be "appropriate"
or "correct."
The combined evidence from the sources above poses major problems
for contemporary congressional short titles for bills and laws, in which
many tend to be tendentious and overly promotional. Moreover, if such
titles had to be genuine, suitable, appropriate, and/or accurate then many
congressional short titles would therefore be improper. For example: does
patriotism genuinely describe the USA PATRIOT Act; is the label "No
Child Left Behind" suitableor appropriatefor an education bill (or any bill,
for that matter); or does the CAN-SPAM Act accurately or appropriately
portray the piece of legislation in question? If one were to draw on the
contemporary definitions of the word proper supplied from state
constitutions, court decisions, drafting manuals, and legal and non-legal
dictionaries, numerous questions arise as to the appropriateness and
constitutionality of many congressional bill titles." From the evidence
supplied above, "proper" should be the constitutional standard by which
bills and laws are drafted, and this standard should be upheld in short titles.

V. THE INTERSECTION BETWEEN FIDUCIARY
PRINCIPLES AND STATUTORY FORM
Given that some type of fiduciary obligation is an inherent aspect of
public service, and thus provides a significant dimension of lawmaking
authority, an exploration into some of the basic fiduciary principles is in
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1335 (9th ed. 2009).
87. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 953 (1st ed. 1991) (definition of "proper").
88. A further question for titles is whether the acronym, the actual title, or both should be
taken into consideration when determining whether such names are indeed proper. This author
believes that both should be taken into consideration in regard to this matter. For, the "proper"
standard would be irrelevant if one of the components was not taken into consideration. Having an
acronym cannot be viewed as a loophole where the actual short title describes the bill somewhat
sufficiently, but the acronym displays the bill in a much different light. Also, it is the acronym by
which legislation is usually referred, and thus it should be taken into consideration when analyzing
short titles.

86.
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order, especially in terms of how they relate to statutory form and short
titles in particular.
Complicit in the role of obtaining fiduciary powers are principles that
one must abide by in such a role. Natelson identifies six basic fiduciary
duties that the Constitution imparted into the government: (1) the duty to
follow instructions and remain within authority; (2) the duties of loyalty and
good faith; (3) the duty of care; (4) the duty to exercise personal discretion;
(5) the duty to account; and (6) the duty of impartiality.89 These shall now
be examined in turn in regard to how they would apply to a "proper" form
of congressional bills and laws, and specifically to short titles. 90

A. THE DUTY To FOLLOW INSTRUCTIONS AND REMAIN WITHIN
AUTHORITY

This discussion mainly takes into consideration the first part of the
phrase, the "duty to follow instructions." 9 1 Article 1, Section 5 of the
Constitution notes that "[e]ach House may determine the rules of its
proceedings."92 Yet neither the House nor the Senate Standing Rules take
short titles into consideration, 93 and Jefferson's Manual barely touches on
them.94 While there is nothing formal in the Constitution and/or the standing
orders for each body, there are drafting rules provided by the House and
Senate Legislative Counsels." However, many congressional short titles,
especially those emanating from the House, are not following their own
legislative counsel's drafting recommendations.9 6 Short titles are supposed
to be "short," used sparingly, and should follow other rules, such as listing
. .

.Amendments Act of [year]" in the title if the new law was amending a

89. Natelson, Legal Origins, supra note 18, at 57-60.
90. It is important to note that I am examining these principles in terms of short titles for bills
and laws, not the further substance of legislation for bills and laws. However, the further
substance of such measures can certainly be taken into consideration in future examinations of
these issues.
91. The "remain[ing] within authority" portion seems to be part of the propriety model which
is discussed throughout this article in relation to the Necessary and Proper Clause, and on which
many commentators and judges have previously touched, but is not the focus of this article.
92. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5.
93.

RULES

OF

THE

HOUSE

OF

REPRESENTATIVES,

112th

Congress,

available at

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/HMAN-l 12/pdf/HMAN-l l2-houserules.pdf (last visited Sept. 13,
2013); STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE, availableat http://www.rules.senate.uov/public/
index.cfn?p=RulesOfSenateHome (last visited Sept. 13, 2013).
94. RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, supra note 93. Jefferson's Manual of
ParliamentaryPracticeis included in House Rules for the I12th Congress.
95. HOUSE LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL, 104th CONG., MANUAL ON DRAFTING STYLE (1995);
SENATE LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL, 105TH CONG., MANUAL ON DRAFTING STYLE (1997).
96. Jones, Short Titles at 455.
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current law, which is often the case.97 Unfortunately, in contemporary times
these drafting rules are rarely followed.98 Therefore, at least in the duty to
"follow[ing] instructions," many short titles provided by lawmakers for
bills and laws are failing to uphold this principle.
B. THE DUTIES OF LOYALTY AND GOOD FAITH
This is perhaps the most severe breach in terms of congressional short
titles, as many do not heed any duty of loyalty to the public and do not
make a good faith effort to describe the legislation in question. Here
Natelson notes that "[fliduciaries were to represent their beneficiaries
honestly and with undivided loyalty and not act in a way prejudicial to
them."99 If this is so, many current short titles are misguided. Oleszek's
CongressionalProcedures text notes that some lawmakers believe these
titles can help get bills noticed and remembered.1' Yet this is not the proper
function of short titles, and this rationale for such titles is just one of the
reasons that the titles have become more evocative. Many contemporary
congressional names are designed to pressure other lawmakers into
supporting or voting for particular laws, or to gather public support.o' It is
clear that many are not remotely designed to provide information to
lawmakers or the general public about laws being introduced, debated,
and/or enacted. The fact that many short titles contain overly tendentious
and aspirational language is evidence enough that such titles are not enacted
in line with duties of loyalty and/or good faith: many are misleading not
only to lawmakers, but constituents as well.102 There seems to be little that

97.

HOUSE LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL, 104TH CONG., MANUAL ON DRAFTING STYLE, 26, 27

(1995) (emphasis in original).
98. See Jones, Short Titles at 464, which demonstrated that some short titles are almost as
long as their long titles. The piece notes that the USA PATRIOT Act's short title is just four
words shorter than its long title. Also, the PROTECT Act of 2003 employs a short title that is
merely one word shorter than the long title. Additionally, a working paper of mine (Brian
Christopher Jones, The CongressionalShort Title (R)Evolution: Changing the Face ofAmerica's
Public Laws, 101 Ky. LJ. ONLINE 42 [hereinafter, Jones, Short Title (R)Evolution]), tracks the

short titles of acts from the 93rd to the Illth Congress and finds that short titles have gotten
longer throughout successive congresses, have increased the number of both personalized and
acronym short titles, and have decreased the use of technical legal words while increasing the use
of more evocative, positive sounding words. See also Brian Christopher Jones, One Redeeming
Quality About the 112th Congress: Refocusing on Descriptive Rather than Evocative Short Titles,

112 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 1.
99. Natelson, Legal Origins, at 58. Unfortunately Natelson does not elaborate on this
throughout the text.
100.

WALTER J. OLESZEK, CONGRESSIONAL PROCEDURES AND THE POLICY PROCESS 93 (8th

ed. 2011).
101.

See Jones, Short Titles.
Brian Christopher Jones, Processes, Standards and Politics:Drafting Short Titles in the
Westminster Parliament,Scottish Parliamentand US Congress25(1) FLA. J. INT'L L. 57, 83-88.

102.
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may be gleaned from a cursory glance at such laws as the PACT Act,o 3 the
CALM Act,' 4 or the STOCK Act.' Additionally, should the general public
believe that bills such as the Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003,106 Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act,107 or the Fair Sentencing Act of
2010,os actually do what they say on the tin? If so, many problems arise
with labeling legislation in this manner.'09
The Restatement (Third) of Agency states under the duties of loyalty:
"An agent who acts for more than one principal [i.e. legislators] in a
transaction between or among them has a duty[:] (a) to deal in good faith
with each principal, (b) to disclose to each principal .. . and (c) otherwise to

deal fairly with each principal."'1 0 Employing language in the short titles of
bills and laws that is meant to pressure legislators into voting for the
measures, and to cast the legislation in the most positive light possible,
rather than briefly to describe the legislation, therefore is not upholding the
principles of loyalty and good faith that such a fiduciary agreement would
warrant.
C. THE DUTY OF CARE
This standard does not have as much overarching applicability as the
previous one, but it still touches on proper short titles. Here, Natelson notes
that the "duty was expressed as an obligation not to neglect the business nor
be guilty of 'folly or negligence."'" Certainly, questions arise as to
whether particular short titles are "folly" and/or "negligent."" 2

103. Prevent All Cigarette Trafficking Act of 2009 (PACT Act), Pub. L. No. 111-154, 124
Stat. 1087 (2010).
104. Commercial Advertisement Loudness Mitigation Act (CALM Act), Pub. L. No. 111-311,
124 Stat. 3294 (2010).
105. Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act of 2012 (STOCK Act), Pub. L. No. 112105, 126 Stat. 291. Additionally, it is unclear how one is supposed to take in acronym titles. Are
they supposed to be taken at face value, with the underlying words treated as nullity? Or are the
underlying words of more value than the actual acronym? This is unclear with contemporary
congressional short titles, and something that needs to be further clarified by Congress.
106. Pub. L. No. 108-79, 117 Stat. 972.
107. Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).
108. Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372.
109. For an example regarding the Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003, and how it has not
remotely led to a reduction in prison rape, see Brian Christopher Jones & Randall Shaheen,
Thought Experiment: Would CongressionalShort Bill Titles Survive FTC Scrutiny?, 37(1) SETON

HALL. LEG. J.57.
110. Restatement (Third) of Agency, § 8.06(2) (2006). § 8.06(2)(b)(i-ii) says: "(i) the fact that
the agent acts for the other principal or principals, and (ii) all other facts that the agent knows, has
reason to know, or should know would reasonably affect the principal's judgment unless the
principal has manifested that such facts are already known by the principal or that the principal
does not wish to know them."
I11. Natelson, Legal Origins at 58.
112. In fact, in the 18th Century these words were used somewhat interchangeably. The
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Contemporary short titles likely fall within the historical and contemporary
definitions of "folly": Samuel Johnson's Dictionary of 1768 defines the
word as: "1. Want of understanding; weakness of intellect. 2. Criminal
weakness; depravity of mind. 3. Act of negligence or passion unbecoming
wisdom."" 3 The phrase "unbecoming wisdom" complements this endeavor,
as the politically tendentious titles employed by Congress do not embody
wise lawmaking. In terms of contemporary definitions of "folly" (i.e. akin
to "foolishness")," 4 it would be difficult not to classify many contemporary
short bill titles as such (e.g. the CALM Act,"' the PACT Act,'16 or the
CHIMP Act"'), not to mention the myriad of short titles that are proposed
each year in bills that never pass. Incorporating slogans, puns, and/or catchy
acronyms into official federal law is perhaps the definition of "folly," be it
historical or modem. Yet whether or not some titles are negligent is difficult
to assess. Should short titles be subject to FTC scrutiny on deceptive
advertising practices, many of them would indeed be classified as such."'
However, is that merely deceitful, or negligent? Negligence would
potentially be a situation where Congress thought they were ameliorating a
problem by enacting a law, when ultimately they did not. Unfortunately
there are many instances of this misguided lawmaking. Take the CANSPAM Act," 9 for example, which some have dubbed the "you CAN-SPAM
Act".12 0 The fact that Congress tendentiously labels many bills and acts
strongly suggests that lawmakers have not followed a duty of care when
preparing many short titles.

definition of folly uses negligence to explain its meaning.
113.

SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (3d ed. 1768). Other

Johnson dictionaries define it in the following manner: "Want of understanding; weakness of
intellect; criminal weakness; depravity of mind; act of negligence or passion unbecoming gravity
or deep wisdom" (SAMUEL JOHNSON & JOHN WALKER, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE (2d ed. 1828).
114.

OXFORD

ENGLISH

DICTIONARY,

available

at

http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/folly?q=folly (last visited Sept. 13, 2013). First
definition of "folly" is: "lack of good sense; foolishness."
115. Commercial Advertisement Loudness Mitigation Act (CALM Act), Pub. L. No. 111-311,
124 Stat. 3294 (2010).
116. Prevent All Cigarette Trafficking Act of 2009 (PACT Act), Pub. L. No. 111-154, 124
Stat. 1087 (2010).
117. Chimpanzee Health Improvement, Maintenance, and Protection (CHIMP) Act, Pub. L.
No. 106-551, 114 Stat. 2752 (2000).
118. See Jones & Shaheen, supra note 109.
119. Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act of 2003 (CANSPAM Act of 2003), Pub. L. No. 108-187, 117 Stat. 2699.
120. Amit Asaravala, With this Law, You Can Spam, WIRED, Jan. 23, 2004,
http://www.wired.com/techbiz/media/news/2004/01/62020 (last visited Sept. 13, 2013); See also,
W. Parker Baxter, Has Spam Been Canned? Consumers, Marketers, and the Making of the CanSpam Act of2003, 8 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 163 (2004-2005).
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D. THE DUTY TO EXERCISE PERSONAL DISCRETION

This is an interesting principle for this article based on the fact that
congressional members are voted into office by the will of the people; ours
is a system of representative government that provides lawmakers with a
certain amount of personal discretion. Short titles apparently fall into this
category, as legislative counsel of both the House and the Senate will draft
a large amount of legislation, but leave short titles in the privy of the
member sponsoring the legislation.121
However, over the last four decades there has been a short title
revolution in Congress, as more technical, legal words were dropped for
more patriotic, evocative sounding words.122 An increased use of acronyms
and personalized short titles has become rampant throughout the years.' 23
Due to this increased focus on the presentational aspects of short titles, the
more descriptive technical aspects of such titles have fallen by the wayside,
while more positive-sounding words have been on the rise. Many of these
new evocative words are tendentious and promotional, and could be
misleading lawmakers and the general public about what the effects of a
particular law may be (e.g. "efficient," "effective" and/or "responsible").
Though personal discretion is granted to lawmakers from a fiduciary
perspective, this does not trump the other duties, such as the duties of care,
loyalty, and good faith. If lawmakers acted under the other duties while
exercising discretion, there would be less overly tendentious and misleading
short titles. This, unfortunately, is not the case.
E.

THE DUTY TO ACCOUNT

The word "account" and its derivations have been on the rise in public
law short titles over the past few decades,' 24 but this duty seems to bear
little impact on this article's endeavor, as it mainly describes the monetary
relationship between a fiduciary and his or her principal.
F.

THE DUTY OF IMPARTIALITY

It is laughable nowadays to think that congressional legislative drafting,
especially in regard to short titles for bills and laws, is impartial. Though
"impartiality" was one of the core principles that Thomas Jefferson laid out
in his Manual, the fact is that many contemporary titles are policy
statements designed to promote a particular law, lawmaker, or political

121. See Jones, supra note 102.
122. See Jones, Short Title (R)Evolution.
123. Id.
124. Id.
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party.125 And though lawmakers have a substantial responsibility to their
constituents, their responsibilities are actually much larger, as the public
laws they pass do not merely govern their own districts, states, or political
parties, but the United States as a whole. Therefore a short title celebrating
a particular policy, individual, or political party is not impartial, and thus
breaches the fiduciary duty of impartiality.
While Natelson explains that propriety should be taken into
consideration regarding the clause, he also expands on this notion by
suggesting the following: "[t]o be 'proper', a law had to be, at the least, in
compliance with the fiduciary duties expected of all public officials. Thus,
to be proper, the law had to be within constitutional authority, reasonably
impartial, adopted in good faith, and with due care-that is, with some
reasonable, factual basis."' 26 The final four criteria are especially relevant to
this endeavor. Being reasonably impartial, adopted in good faith, with due
care, and with some reasonable, factual basis are four valuable criteria that
could be ascertained when drafting proper short titles for bills and laws.
Moreover, the legitimacy of many congressional short titles would certainly
be called into question under these principles.

VI.

POTENTIAL REMEDY:

A REASONABLE

NOTICE

STANDARD
Reasonable notice is an element directly related to short titles that
accentuates fiduciary responsibilities and proper drafting form that could
(and should) come into play regarding this matter. The primary difference
between some U.S. states and Congress is that many explicitly require bill
titles to provide fair notice and be comprehensible to citizens and
lawmakers. Reasonable notice also fits the contextual nature of the
Necessary and Proper Clause. For, if a law misleads either legislators or the
general public, then it certainly is not "properfor carrying into execution
the foregoing powers," 27 and is therefore unconstitutional.
What is recognized here is the fundamental right, where practicable, of
citizens and lawmakers to have reasonable access not only to the bills being
proposed, but eventually to the law that governs them. For example:
Montana states that "the title of a bill gives reasonable notice of the content

125. Thomas Jefferson, A MANUAL OF PARLIAMENTARY PRACTICE: COMPOSED ORIGINALLY
FOR THE USE OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE 2 (1856).

126.

Natelson, FramingandAdoption, at 119.

127.

U.S. Const. art. 1,§ 8, cl. 18 (emphasis added).
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to legislators and the public;"l2 8 Oregon states that "the purpose of the
constitutional title requirement is to prevent the concealment of the true
nature of the provisions of the bill from the legislature and the public;"'2 9 as
noted above, Maryland's manual notes that "[i]f a bill's subject matter is
broader than its title, the bill is unconstitutional because the requirement of
proper notice to legislators and citizens is not fulfilled;"'30 and the Texas
Constitution declares that the "rules of procedure of each house shall
require that the subject of each bill be expressed in its title in a manner that
gives the legislature and the public reasonable notice of that subject. The
legislature is solely responsible for determining compliance with the
rule."'' This list could easily be elongated, as the principle of reasonable
notice was one of the primary rationales behind state single-subject
provisions.'3 2
In regard to endorsing a simple or straightforward reasonable notice
requirement in any manner whatsoever, Congress clearly lacks such
standards. There appear to be no restrictions or standards, formal or
informal, in regard to how bill titles are named, and congressional
interviewees involved in my doctoral research admitted that short titles are
often misleading.' 33 In turn, if such titles are misleading to lawmakers, they
128. LEGISLATIVE SERVICES DIVISION, MONTANA BILL DRAFTING MANUAL at 45 (2008),
available at http://leg.mt.gov/content/publications/2008_billdrafting-manual.pdf (last visited
Sept. 13, 2013).
129. Northern Wasco County PUD v. Wasco County, 210 Or. 1, 305 P.2d 766 (1957); State v.
Williamson, 4 Or. App. 41, 475 P.2d 593 (1970). Citation from OREGON BILL DRAFTING
MANUAL, Section 5.1 (2012), available at http://www.1c.state.or.us/pdfs/draftingmanual.pdf (last
visited Sept. 13, 2013).
130. DEPARTMENT OF LEGISLATIVE SERVICES, MARYLAND LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING
MANUAL, at 29 (2011), available at http://dis.state.md.us/datallegandanallegandanabildra/
legandanabildrabildraman/BillDraftingManual20 1.pdf (last visited Sept. 13, 2013).
131. TEX. CONST. art. III, § 35(b).
132. For example, the following excerpt comes from a Supreme Court case in Iowa: "The
second provision requires the subject of a bill to be expressed in the title. The primary purpose of
this provision is to provide reasonable notice of the purview of the act to the legislative members
and to the public. The title provides an easy 'means for concerned parties to find out what a bill or
act is about without reading it in full'. The provision ultimately serves to prevent surprise and
fraud from being visited on the legislature and the public. Thus, the title requirement is directed
more to the integrity of the legislative process by preventing laws from being surreptitiously
passed with 'provisions incongruous with the subject proclaimed in the title'. It surfaced as a
constitutional requirement as a result of public demand derived from a prevailing sense that bills
giving substantial grants to private parties were often 'smuggled through the legislature under an
innocent and deceptive title'." Godfrey v. State, 752 N.W.2d 413, 426-427 (Iowa 2008) (citing
Giles v. State, 511 N.W.2d 622, 625 (Iowa 1994); Long v. Bd. of Supervisors, 142 N.W.2d 378,
383 (Iowa 1966); NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 17:1 at 5,
40, 41, 50 (6th ed. 2000)), Also, the Iowa Supreme Court states that "[t]he first provision is
referred to as the single-subject requirement. It exists to 'facilitate concentration on the meaning
and wisdom of independent legislative proposals or provisions'." Godfrey. 752 N.W.2d at 426.
133. Jones, supra note 102; Interview with Member of Congress (MCONI) in Washington
D.C. (Oct. 29, 2009), Interview with Member of Congress 2 (MCON2) in Washington D.C. (Oct.
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are very likely misleading and confusing to constituents, both in terms of
the laws proposed and of the laws enacted. Implementing a set of rules or
regulatory guidelines in regard to short titles that provide a necessary
informational component to both lawmakers and citizens of the bills
introduced and the laws that govern them would be of much benefit at the
federal level. Additionally, it would satisfy the fiduciary obligations and
proper drafting form that appear to be inherent in the Constitution itself.

VII. CONCLUSION
What I have proposed here is not an exceedingly difficult or
burdensome standard to which congressional legislation should be held.
The simple fact that a fiduciary should not deceive the principal is not an
issue that is widely debated; it is exceedingly conventional. Additionally,
that bills, and specifically short titles, should be properly drafted and
provide reasonable notice to lawmakers and constituents is not a radical
idea; it has been implemented and adjudicated in states for many decades.
Thus, what possible justification could lawmakers provide, outside of their
own personal benefit, for permitting short titles that are deliberately
tendentious or promotional, and mislead those who encounter them?
After two hundred plus years, it is unlikely that an authoritative and
decisive interpretation will be found that reveals or comprehensively
describes the true meaning of the Necessary and Proper Clause. The best
modem scholars can do at this point is to keep constructing, hypothesizing,
and providing evidence for the best possible historical and modern
interpretations of the phrase "necessary and proper."
Although a good amount of concern has been devoted to the meaning of
"proper" from a proprietary standpoint, and understandably so, there
appears to be a legitimate place underneath the Necessary and Proper
Clause to incorporate the drafting aspects of bills and laws, and
acknowledge the notion that all aspects of federal law should be "proper."
Laws that mislead legislators, citizens, and others about the true nature of
what those laws are going to accomplish or about what those laws
inherently regard would not be "proper" under any of the historical or
modern definitions which this article has examined.
Although Thomas Jefferson gave short shrift to bill titles in his Manual
of Parliamentary Practice, his closing statement on the preface to the
manual could serve as general guidance on such matters:

21, 2009).
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But I have begun a sketch, which those who come after me
will successively correct and fill up, till a code of rules
shall be formed for use of the Senate, the effects of which
may be accuracy in business, economy of time, order,
34
uniformity and impartiality.1
A focus on the positive presentational aspects of legislation at times
disregards the substance of such legislation, the latter of which is
paramount not only to the lawmakers involved in approving such measures,
but also to the citizens who are governed by such laws. As Jefferson aptly
points out, "[i]t is material that order, decency and regularity be preserved
in a dignified public body."' These words could not ring truer than they do
today in regard to congressional bills and laws, and especially in relation to
short titles. And it just so happens that a curt, yet much debated,
constitutional clause may indeed contain the solution to such measures: that
they "be. . .proper."' 36

134. JEFFERSON, supra note 125, at vi (emphasis added).

135. Id., at 14.
136. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8.

